The Globalist: The Globalist - Unreal Portal

The President announced yesterday that the United States will withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of the year. This ends months of speculation on U.S. troop levels in Iraq beyond 2011 and confirms the Associated Press reports from last week of a total withdrawal.

I wrote an Op-Ed for the Wall Street Journal last month entitled “We’ve Won in Iraq So Let’s Leave” and an editorial for FoxNews.com last week calling for just this outcome. In these I argued it was time the United States declare victory in Iraq and shift precious military resources to the highest priority mission in Afghanistan. Despite the hope of many U.S. military commanders to keep a large U.S. force in Iraq beyond 2011, the decision to withdraw all forces appears to have been based on the Iraqi Parliament’s refusal to grant immunity in Iraqi courts to U.S. military forces. This, in effect, is Iraq politely telling us that it’s time to go. They are confident enough to stand on their own. And while different than we might have originally envisioned, I would argue that this is, in fact, what victory looks like.


But while I applaud the decision to withdraw all U.S. Forces, I offer harsh criticism of the President for the following reasons outlined below.

President Obama said that U.S. troops could leave Iraq “with their heads held high, proud of their success and knowing that the American people stand united in our support for our troops.” But never was there an acknowledgment of the extraordinary security gains that were achieved in Iraq when many insisted that Iraq was lost. The U.S. Servicemen and women who fought in Iraq through the darkest days of the war--when almost no one thought America could reverse the radically deteriorating security situation – smashed the insurgency and achieved a radical reduction in violence levels at tremendous cost and personal sacrifice. The insurgents, too, know full well that they were soundly defeated; so much so, that the local populace turned on them and joined with U.S and Iraqi Security Forces. It’s important the American people know and appreciate the spectacular successes that we achieved in Iraq from 2006-2008. It was not without tremendous cost. Thousands of U.S. personnel made the ultimate sacrifice and many more were gravely wounded. Their lives, and the lives of their loved ones, are forever changed. Our victory in Iraq is a tribute to them and all Americans should be proud at this spectacular success. It is equally important that the global jihadist movement is forced to confront and accept their defeat in Iraq.

Yet, the President acknowledged none of these “successes.” There was no declaration of victory. Because declaring victory would mean that President Obama would have to admit that he was wrong on Iraq. He was wrong in advocating retreat when all was going badly. He was wrong in saying the surge would not work. He was wrong in insisting that victory could never be achieved. And so there will be no victory declared.

The announcement for a total withdrawal, said President Obama, fulfills his campaign promise to end the war, and the press gives him credit for “accelerating” the U.S. draw down. But the timeline for withdrawal for U.S. Forces in December 2011 precisely corresponds with the security agreement negotiated with Iraq in November 2008 under the Bush Administration. President Obama is simply carrying out the plan as laid out by is often-criticized predecessor.

The Commander-in-Chief promised American Forces in Iraq will be home for the holidays. But the announcement of the exact timetable for withdrawal puts those U.S. forces at a distinct tactical disadvantage as they depart—a major concern for U.S. commanders on the ground in Iraq. There are staggering numbers of armored vehicles, weapons, communications gear and heavy equipment to transport and only limited routes out of Iraq. This makes it easier for U.S. forces to be targeted by insurgents as they withdraw through chokepoints, especially in Southern Iraq as they transit toward Kuwait.

The President declared yesterday that with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and impending drawdown in Afghanistan, “the tide of war is receding.” But to even the most novice student of history, America’s enemies are at move in the world like never before in the last half-century. Despite a string of successes against Al Qaeda, the ability of the U.S. to deter our enemies has plummeted to a new low not seen since the Carter Administration. Iran pursues the development of nuclear weapons unabated, without fear of U.S. preemptive military action , and promises to fulfill its dreams to wipe Israel off the map and destroy the United States. Many cling to the hope that the “Arab Spring” will usher in democracy and freedom to the Arab world. But it could alternatively boost the Muslim Brother to power and usher in a new era of radical Islam in once fairly secular nations; this would almost certainly derail the fragile peace between Israel and its neighbors and bring war to the Middle East. China has ramped up production of the tools of power projection including aircraft carriers and stealth aircraft. And Vladimir Putin has vowed to reestablish Russia’s once unprecedented military might.

And this applies to non-state actors as well. U.S. Federal agents are gunned down by Mexican drug cartels with no fear of retribution. Teenage Somali pirates kidnap and often murder U.S. and Western European hostages despite billion-dollar U.S. and NATO warships “monitoring” the situation close by with firepower beyond any in history. All this while the United States slashes its defense budget to an unprecedented degree, and many politicians cry for even more drastic cuts in defense.

Our enemies do not fear American military might because they recognize that our leaders lack the will to use that force against them or even declare victory when we win. A strong United States is imperative for the peace and stability of the world. And this is integral to deter our enemies and prevent future wars. But the perceived weakness of the Obama Administration in the eyes of our enemies only serves to ensure that we will, in all likelihood, fight additional and perhaps far more costly wars again in the near future.

Leif Babin is a former Navy SEAL officer who served three tours in Iraq, earning a Silver Star, two Bronze Stars and a Purple Heart.

Read more:
http://www.foxnews.c.../#ixzz1baL0KSCJ

This guy is right on the money. To bad Obama is more worried about pride and ego then doing the right thing and what is in the best interest of this nation.

Albert Einstein's letter on Nazis sold for $14,000

A 1939 letter from Albert Einstein warning of the "calamitous peril" to Jews posed by the Nazis has been sold at auction for nearly $14,000 (£9,000).

The Nobel-winning physicist's letter to a New York businessman, Hyman Zinn, sold for double its estimate at auction in the US state of California.

In the typed letter, Einstein praises Zinn for his work in helping Jews flee persecution in Adolf Hitler's Germany.

Einstein himself fled Germany for the US when Hitler came to power in 1933.

"It must be a source of deep gratification to you to be making so important a contribution toward rescuing our persecuted fellow-Jews from their calamitous peril and leading them toward a better future," he wrote.


The letter - described as in "very good to near fine condition" - sold for $13,936 including buyer's premium, said Los Angeles auction house Nate D Sanders.

Dated 10 June 1939, it has Einstein's embossed Princeton University address and the original mailing envelope.

The reserve price was between $5,000 and $7,000.

The author of the theory of general relativity wrote: "The power of resistance which has enabled the Jewish people to survive for thousands of years has been based to a large extent on traditions of mutual helpfulness.

"In these years of affliction our readiness to help one another is being put to an especially severe test. May we stand this test as well as did our fathers before us."

Einstein Letter

A bit preposterous I'd say!


http://blog.mises.or...th-wall-street/

The Palestinian Authority will not be recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas said Saturday, adopting a belligerent tone ahead of his planned statehood bid in September. The Palestinian leader also criticized demands made by the International Quartet of his Authority, urging the international community to back off.

“Don’t order us to recognize a Jewish state,” Abbas said. “We won’t accept it.”

_____________________


Interesting!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




http://quitenormal.w...so-quit-asking/







He is playing a dangerous Game!

All not to appear a Traitor to his People,while causing more hardship for them,and isolating Israel!

Guess that's the price he is paying for the Arab States and Iranian support!

Is Abbas creating problems for future Palestinian Leaders by unilaterally declaring a State,
and practically violating every Agreement with Israel?

http://www.camera.or...&x_article=2036

Seems he is creating more problems for his People,instead of solving them!

Backgrounder: A Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)
_____________
Palestinian leaders including Chief Negotiator Sa'eb Erakat, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Foreign Minister Riad Malki have declared the Palestinians' intention to achieve statehood through a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) via the United Nations, rather than through negotiations with Israel:

• The choice of Palestine applying to the Security Council for a full membership is a realistic one that we must work on applying as soon as possible... We are convinced that negotiation with (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu's government is impossible because it refuses to stop settlement activities. So the Palestinian leadership decided to start implementing alternatives to negotiations and the first of these is demanding recognition. (Saeb Erakat, AFP, March 20, 2011)

• The Palestinian government is struggling determinedly against a hostile occupation regime... in order to establish a de facto state apparatus within the next two years. (Salam Fayyad, AFP, Aug. 25, 2009)

• Until this moment [a negotiated peace deal] is our choice, and it will continue to be our choice until September 2011... [but the] current peace process as it has been conducted so far is over. (Riad Malki, Jerusalem Post, Mar. 23, 2011)

(Malki claims that this would be a unilateral declaration by the "international community" rather than by the Palestinians.)

However phrased, such a move by the Palestinian side would fundamentally violate agreements with Israel that were mediated and witnessed by the United States, would be unlikely to be effective, might provoke unilateral moves by Israel, might also provoke violent clashes, and would certainly hinder rather than advance the search for peace.

How would a Palestinian Unilateral Declaration or appeal to the United Nations violate existing agreements?

All major agreements between Israel and the Palestinians have required that disputes between the parties be settled through direct negotiations and not via third parties. For example, the Declaration of Principles (Sept. 13, 1993), which formalized the direct Israeli-Palestinian peace process, required in Article XV that:

Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

The Declaration was signed on the White House lawn and witnessed by the United States and the Russian Federation...............

This is a lengthy Article,so I have only posted the first part of it!Read the rest at the Link I provided
It goes on to explain,that a Recognition by the UN would actually violate International Law!

Intelligence Guidance: Myth and Reality in Syria's Crisis Read more: Intelligence Guidance: Myth and Reality in Syria's Crisis | STRATFOR

Editor’s Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.

Related Special Topic Page

• Weekly Intelligence That Drives Our Analysis

New Guidance

Uncovering the Reality of the Syrian Crisis
The crisis in Syria remains our priority issue. Operate under three possible scenarios: a protracted, multiyear crisis in which the al Assad clan eventually loses power; a crisis within the regime that fractures the Alawite community and leads to a long period of instability; and a foreign-backed opposition that becomes strong enough to overwhelm the Syrian regime and cause it to collapse. The last of these scenarios appears least likely based on the information we have collected thus far, but we need to uncover the basics to build out our forecast.

• What is the reality of the Syrian opposition? Look at the reporting to trace demonstrations back to their source — investigate the sources of the demonstrations’ assistance and funding and their dates of creation and base of operations. While building a timeline, look for patterns within the reporting of the demonstrations. Determine whether or not we are seeing the same phenomenon we uncovered in Iran following the 2009 presidential election: misleading mainstream media reports claiming spontaneous, massive demonstrations, which in turn aimed to create a myth of imminent regime collapse. The media will continue to be infatuated by the persistence of the demonstrators; our job is to strip the emotion out of this issue and lay out what is actually happening on the ground.
• How are the protesters sustaining themselves? How are they communicating and organizing themselves? Map out the various opposition factions, noting the heavy involvement of exiles. Probe into the current state of the Sunni Islamist opposition in Syria. Is there any evidence of protesters receiving arms, and if so, from where and through what routes?
• Maintain an extremely watchful eye on the four key pillars sustaining the al Assad regime so far. These keystones include the continued unity of the al Assad clan and the cohesion of the military-intelligence apparatus. (Beyond the desertions of Sunni conscripts, the key question is whether ranking Alawites are holding together and remain willing to carry out crackdowns.) The unity of the Alawites throughout the country needs to be monitored, as does the Baath Party’s political monopoly. A breakdown of any one of these pillars could be the precursor to regime collapse.
• Remember that the al Assad regime will spend the most resources in maintaining control over the capital Damascus and the country’s financial hub, Aleppo. Describe the level of dissent in these two areas and the measures employed thus far by the regime to contain that dissent. Are there any real signs that the largely Sunni urban merchant class will defect through a strike — risking the economic costs of such a move in hopes of having picked the winning side?
• We are hearing rumors of an impending operation, on the scale of Hama in 1982, to take place in Homs in northwestern Syria or in Idlib, near the border with Turkey. Watch for military movements toward this end.
• Understand the level of existing and potential sources of foreign support in this conflict. This list includes Iranian and Hezbollah support for the al Assad regime, as well as Turkish, Saudi, U.S. and French support for the country’s fractured opposition. How far is each of these players willing to go to achieve their strategic aims? What constraints do they face?
• Remember to watch Lebanon for signs of an escalation of the Syria crisis. The factions in Lebanon will be among the first to react if the tide turns against the al Assad regime.

Turkey’s Moves in the Eastern Mediterranean
Diplomatic tensions are escalating again between Israel and Turkey. Our running assessment is that Turkey can afford and benefit from such a crisis with Israel, while Israel cannot afford the diplomatic isolation. How far does Turkey intend to go in prolonging the crisis and in trying to expand its influence to the eastern Mediterranean? Is Turkey serious about sending its navy to escort aid ships to Gaza? Watch exchanges between Turkey and Egypt closely to determine what role Turkey can play in an increasingly strained Egyptian-Israeli relationship. Watch for details on bargains between the United States and Turkey (for example, on the issue of ballistic missile defense) as Turkey negotiates for U.S. tolerance of Ankara’s behavior toward Israel in exchange for cooperation on other strategic matters.


Russian Influence in Ukraine
It is time for an internal reassessment on the level of Russian influence in Ukraine. With Nord Stream coming online and ready to supply strategic downstream states like Germany and Ukraine losing its leverage as a transit state as a result, we need a forecast on the potential for a full-blown energy crisis between Ukraine and Russia before the year’s end.


Germany and the Eurozone Crisis
In the lead-up to a crucial Sept. 29 Bundestag vote, German Chancellor Angela Merkel is trying to cobble together a coalition that will support strengthening the European Financial Stability Facility to deal with the eurozone crisis. We need to watch for any arrestors of our current expectation that the vote will succeed. Watch for signs that Merkel is failing in this effort. In particular, look for any rising mavericks in her center-right coalition who might try to use this contentious issue as a lever to bring down the government.


The Future of the Russian Leadership
We are approaching an announcement by the Russian leadership on whether Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will run for president again. Considering the handful of people within the Kremlin who actually know the answer to this question, we need to build out an impersonal analysis in determining the extent to which personality matters in this decision and whether the identity of Russia’s president will have any real strategic implications.




Continuing Guidance
Click here for continuing guidance on Islamist opportunities in Libya, deciphering Hamas’ agenda in the lead-up to the U.N. vote on Palestinian statehood, Pakistan’s role in U.S.-Taliban negotiations and the U.S.-Iranian struggle for influence in Iraq.

Click here for continuing guidance on Russian-Iranian relations and social stability in China.


Read more: Intelligence Guidance: Myth and Reality in Syria's Crisis | STRATFOR

"U.S.-Pakistani Relations Beyond Bin Laden is republished with permission of STRATFOR."

Read more: U.S.-Pakistani Relations Beyond Bin Laden | STRATFOR

U.S.-Pakistani Relations Beyond Bin Laden

By George Friedman

The past week has been filled with announcements and speculations on how Osama bin Laden was killed and on Washington’s source of intelligence. After any operation of this sort, the world is filled with speculation on sources and methods by people who don’t know, and silence or dissembling by those who do.

Obfuscating on how intelligence was developed and on the specifics of how an operation was carried out is an essential part of covert operations. The precise process must be distorted to confuse opponents regarding how things actually played out; otherwise, the enemy learns lessons and adjusts. Ideally, the enemy learns the wrong lessons, and its adjustments wind up further weakening it. Operational disinformation is the final, critical phase of covert operations. So as interesting as it is to speculate on just how the United States located bin Laden and on exactly how the attack took place, it is ultimately not a fruitful discussion. Moreover, it does not focus on the truly important question, namely, the future of U.S.-Pakistani relations.


Posturing Versus a Genuine Breach
It is not inconceivable that Pakistan aided the United States in identifying and capturing Osama bin Laden, but it is unlikely. This is because the operation saw the already-tremendous tensions between the two countries worsen rather than improve. The Obama administration let it be known that it saw Pakistan as either incompetent or duplicitous and that it deliberately withheld plans for the operation from the Pakistanis. For their part, the Pakistanis made it clear that further operations of this sort on Pakistani territory could see an irreconcilable breach between the two countries. The attitudes of the governments profoundly affected the views of politicians and the public, attitudes that will be difficult to erase.

Posturing designed to hide Pakistani cooperation would be designed to cover operational details, not to lead to significant breaches between countries. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan ultimately is far more important than the details of how Osama bin Laden was captured, but both sides have created a tense atmosphere that they will find difficult to contain. One would not sacrifice strategic relationships for the sake of operational security. Therefore, we have to assume that the tension is real and revolves around the different goals of Pakistan and the United States.

A break between the United States and Pakistan holds significance for both sides. For Pakistan, it means the loss of an ally that could help Pakistan fend off its much larger neighbor to the east, India. For the United States, it means the loss of an ally in the war in Afghanistan. Whether the rupture ultimately occurs, of course, depends on how deep the tension goes. And that depends on what the tension is over, i.e., whether the tension ultimately merits the strategic rift. It also is a question of which side is sacrificing the most. It is therefore important to understand the geopolitics of U.S.-Pakistani relations beyond the question of who knew what about bin Laden.


From Cold to Jihadist War
U.S. strategy in the Cold War included a religious component, namely, using religion to generate tension within the Communist bloc. This could be seen in the Jewish resistance in the Soviet Union, in Roman Catholic resistance in Poland and, of course, in Muslim resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, it took the form of using religious Islamist militias to wage a guerrilla war against Soviet occupation. A three-part alliance involving the Saudis, the Americans and the Pakistanis fought the Soviets. The Pakistanis had the closest relationships with the Afghan resistance due to ethnic and historical bonds, and the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had built close ties with the Afghans.

As frequently happens, the lines of influence ran both ways. The ISI did not simply control Islamist militants, but instead many within the ISI came under the influence of radical Islamist ideology. This reached the extent that the ISI became a center of radical Islamism, not so much on an institutional level as on a personal level: The case officers, as the phrase goes, went native. As long as the U.S. strategy remained to align with radical Islamism against the Soviets, this did not pose a major problem. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States lost interest in the future of Afghanistan, managing the conclusion of the war fell to the Afghans and to the Pakistanis through the ISI. In the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States played a trivial role. It was the ISI in alliance with the Taliban — a coalition of Afghan and international Islamist fighters who had been supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — that shaped the future of Afghanistan.

The U.S.-Islamist relationship was an alliance of convenience for both sides. It was temporary, and when the Soviets collapsed, Islamist ideology focused on new enemies, the United States chief among them. Anti-Soviet sentiment among radical Islamists soon morphed into anti-American sentiment. This was particularly true after the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm. The Islamists perceived the U.S. occupation and violation of Saudi territorial integrity as a religious breach. Therefore, at least some elements of international Islamism focused on the United States; al Qaeda was central among these elements. Al Qaeda needed a base of operations after being expelled from Sudan, and Afghanistan provided the most congenial home. In moving to Afghanistan and allying with the Taliban, al Qaeda inevitably was able to greatly expand its links with Pakistan’s ISI, which was itself deeply involved with the Taliban.

After 9/11, Washington demanded that the Pakistanis aid the United States in its war against al Qaeda and the Taliban. For Pakistan, this represented a profound crisis. On the one hand, Pakistan badly needed the United States to support it against what it saw as its existential enemy, India. On the other hand, Islamabad found it difficult to rupture or control the intimate relationships, ideological and personal, that had developed between the ISI and the Taliban, and by extension with al Qaeda to some extent. In Pakistani thinking, breaking with the United States could lead to strategic disaster with India. However, accommodating the United States could lead to unrest, potential civil war and even collapse by energizing elements of the ISI and supporters of Taliban and radical Islamism in Pakistan.


The Pakistani Solution
The Pakistani solution was to appear to be doing everything possible to support the United States in Afghanistan, with a quiet limit on what that support would entail. That limit on support set by Islamabad was largely defined as avoiding actions that would trigger a major uprising in Pakistan that could threaten the regime. Pakistanis were prepared to accept a degree of unrest in supporting the war but not to push things to the point of endangering the regime.

The Pakistanis thus walked a tightrope between demands they provide intelligence on al Qaeda and Taliban activities and permit U.S. operations in Pakistan on one side and the internal consequences of doing so on the other. The Pakistanis’ policy was to accept a degree of unrest to keep the Americans supporting Pakistan against India, but only to a point. So, for example, the government purged the ISI of its overt supporters of radial Islamism, but it did not purge the ISI wholesale nor did it end informal relations between purged intelligence officers and the ISI. Pakistan thus pursued a policy that did everything to appear to be cooperative while not really meeting American demands.

The Americans were, of course, completely aware of the Pakistani limits and did not ultimately object to this arrangement. The United States did not want a coup in Islamabad, nor did it want massive civil unrest. The United States needed Pakistan on whatever terms the Pakistanis could provide help. It needed the supply line through Pakistan from Karachi to the Khyber Pass. And while it might not get complete intelligence from Pakistan, the intelligence it did get was invaluable. Moreover, while the Pakistanis could not close the Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, they could limit them and control their operation to some extent. The Americans were as aware as the Pakistanis that the choice was between full and limited cooperation, but could well be between limited and no cooperation, because the government might well not survive full cooperation. The Americans thus took what they could get.

Obviously, this relationship created friction. The Pakistani position was that the United States had helped create this reality in the 1980s and 1990s. The American position was that after 9/11, the price of U.S. support involved the Pakistanis changing their policies. The Pakistanis said there were limits. The Americans agreed, so the fight was about defining the limits.

The Americans felt that the limit was support for al Qaeda. They felt that whatever Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban was, support in suppressing al Qaeda, a separate organization, had to be absolute. The Pakistanis agreed in principle but understood that the intelligence on al Qaeda flowed most heavily from those most deeply involved with radical Islamism. In others words, the very people who posed the most substantial danger to Pakistani stability were also the ones with the best intelligence on al Qaeda — and therefore, fulfilling the U.S. demand in principle was desirable. In practice, it proved difficult for Pakistan to carry out.


The Breakpoint and the U.S. Exit From Afghanistan
This proved the breakpoint between the two sides. The Americans accepted the principle of Pakistani duplicity, but drew a line at al Qaeda. The Pakistanis understood American sensibilities but didn’t want to incur the domestic risks of going too far. This psychological breakpoint cracked open on Osama bin Laden, the Holy Grail of American strategy and the third rail of Pakistani policy.

Under normal circumstances, this level of tension of institutionalized duplicity should have blown the U.S.-Pakistani relationship apart, with the United States simply breaking with Pakistan. It did not, and likely will not for a simple geopolitical reason, one that goes back to the 1990s. In the 1990s, when the United States no longer needed to support an intensive covert campaign in Afghanistan, it depended on Pakistan to manage Afghanistan. Pakistan would have done this anyway because it had no choice: Afghanistan was Pakistan’s backdoor, and given tensions with India, Pakistan could not risk instability in its rear. The United States thus did not have to ask Pakistan to take responsibility for Afghanistan.

The United States is now looking for an exit from Afghanistan. Its goal, the creation of a democratic, pro-American Afghanistan able to suppress radical Islamism in its own territory, is unattainable with current forces — and probably unattainable with far larger forces. Gen. David Petraeus, the architect of the Afghan strategy, has been nominated to become the head of the CIA. With Petraeus departing from the Afghan theater, the door is open to a redefinition of Afghan strategy. Despite Pentagon doctrines of long wars, the United States is not going to be in a position to engage in endless combat in Afghanistan. There are other issues in the world that must be addressed. With bin Laden’s death, a plausible (if not wholly convincing) argument can be made that the mission in AfPak, as the Pentagon refers to the theater, has been accomplished, and therefore the United States can withdraw.

No withdrawal strategy is conceivable without a viable Pakistan. Ideally, Pakistan would be willing to send forces into Afghanistan to carry out U.S. strategy. This is unlikely, as the Pakistanis don’t share the American concern for Afghan democracy, nor are they prepared to try directly to impose solutions in Afghanistan. At the same time, Pakistan can’t simply ignore Afghanistan because of its own national security issues, and therefore it will move to stabilize it.

The United States could break with Pakistan and try to handle things on its own in Afghanistan, but the supply line fueling Afghan fighting runs through Pakistan. The alternatives either would see the United States become dependent on Russia — an equally uncertain line of supply — or on the Caspian route, which is insufficient to supply forces. Afghanistan is war at the end of the Earth for the United States, and to fight it, Washington must have Pakistani supply routes.

The United States also needs Pakistan to contain, at least to some extent, Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. The United States is stretched to the limit doing what it is doing in Afghanistan. Opening a new front in Pakistan, a country of 180 million people, is well beyond the capabilities of either forces in Afghanistan or forces in the U.S. reserves. Therefore, a U.S. break with Pakistan threatens the logistical foundation of the war in Afghanistan and poses strategic challenges U.S. forces cannot cope with.

The American option might be to support a major crisis between Pakistan and India to compel Pakistan to cooperate with the United States. However, it is not clear that India is prepared to play another round in the U.S. game with Pakistan. Moreover, creating a genuine crisis between India and Pakistan could have two outcomes. The first involves the collapse of Pakistan, which would create an India more powerful than the United States might want. The second and more likely outcome would see the creation of a unity government in Pakistan in which distinctions between secularists, moderate Islamists and radical Islamists would be buried under anti-Indian feeling. Doing all of this to deal with Afghan withdrawal would be excessive, even if India played along, and could well prove disastrous for Washington.

Ultimately, the United States cannot change its policy of the last 10 years. During that time, it has come to accept what support the Pakistanis could give and tolerated what was withheld. U.S. dependence on Pakistan so long as Washington is fighting in Afghanistan is significant; the United States has lived with Pakistan’s multitiered policy for a decade because it had to. Nothing in the capture of bin Laden changes the geopolitical realities. So long as the United States wants to wage — or end — a war in Afghanistan, it must have the support of Pakistan to the extent that Pakistan is prepared to provide it. The option of breaking with Pakistan because on some level it is acting in opposition to American interests does not exist.

This is the ultimate contradiction in U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and even the so-called war on terror as a whole. The United States has an absolute opposition to terrorism and has waged a war in Afghanistan on the questionable premise that the tactic of terrorism can be defeated, regardless of source or ideology. Broadly fighting terrorism requires the cooperation of the Muslim world, as U.S. intelligence and power is inherently limited. The Muslim world has an interest in containing terrorism, but not the absolute concern the United States has. Muslim countries are not prepared to destabilize their countries in service to the American imperative. This creates deeper tensions between the United States and the Muslim world and increases the American difficulty in dealing with terrorism — or with Afghanistan.

The United States must either develop the force and intelligence to wage war without any assistance, which is difficult to imagine given the size of the Muslim world and the size of the U.S. military, or it will have to accept half-hearted support and duplicity. Alternatively, it could accept that it will not win in Afghanistan and will not be able simply to eliminate terrorism. These are difficult choices, but the reality of Pakistan drives home that these, in fact, are the choices.


"U.S.-Pakistani Relations Beyond Bin Laden is republished with permission of STRATFOR."
Read more: U.S.-Pakistani Relations Beyond Bin Laden | STRATFOR

Somehow my Status as Administrator has either gone Poof,never had it,or I somehow screwed it up!

"Very soon, God willing, their joy will turn into mourning and their blood will be mixed with their tears. We will fulfil Sheikh Osama's oath, God bless his soul: 'America and anyone who lives in America will not enjoy peace until our people in Palestine enjoy it."

A statement attributed to al-Qaeda has acknowledged the death of its leader, Osama Bin Laden, at the hands of the Americans.

The statement, published on jihadist internet forums, vows to continue attacks on the US and its "agents" and says an audiotape recorded by Bin Laden shortly before his death would be released soon.

The communique - attributed to al-Qaeda's General Command - is dated 3 May. Here are some excerpts.

"On an historical day of the days of the great Islamic Ummah [community of Muslims worldwide]... the mujahid migrant ascetic leader - Sheikh Abu Abdullah Osama Bin Mohammed Bin Laden (may God bless his soul) has been killed in a moment of truthfulness, for he made his word truthful to his actions.

"Thus, he joined the magnificent procession of the Ummah that has been extended with the great leaders, loyal soldiers, and honourable knights.

"He refused to accept vice in exchange for his religion, or to submit and be humiliated by the misguided and the receivers of the wrath [of God], who have been stricken by disgrace and misery. The sheikh faced the weapon with weapon, force with force, and accepted to challenge the supercilious throngs that came out arrogantly and ostentatiously with their machinery, gear, aircrafts, and armies.

"Despite all this, his determination never wavered and his strength was never weakened; he instead stood up to them, face-to-face like a high mountain. He continued to fight the kind of battles that he was accustomed to... until he received the bullets of deception and non-belief to surrender his soul to its Creator...

"After a life full of efforts and diligence, courage and patience, incitement and jihad, generosity and charity, expatriation and travels, advice and good planning, wisdom and sophistication, the life of the sheikh came to an end during this specific era.

"His blood, words, attitudes, and his ending are to remain a soul running within the junctions of our Islamic Ummah generation after generation."

“We call on our Muslim people in Pakistan where Sheikh Usama was killed to revolt and wash this shame brought upon them by a band of traitors and bandits”

"If the Americans succeeded in killing Osama, that is no shame or disgrace. Are not men and heroes killed but on the battlefields? But can the Americans, with their media, agents, tools, soldiers, and apparatus kill what Sheikh Osama lived and died for?

"Alas! The sheikh did not found an organisation that lives with his life and dies with his death."

Uh Oh... trouble brewing?

How to tell if your meighbor is a bombmaker is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

How to Tell if Your Neighbor is a Bombmaker
By Scott Stewart

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released the fifth edition of its English-language jihadist magazine “Inspire” on March 30. AQAP publishes this magazine with the stated intent of radicalizing English-speaking Muslims and encouraging them to engage in jihadist militant activity. Since its inception, Inspire magazine has also advocated the concept that jihadists living in the West should conduct attacks there, rather than traveling to places like Pakistan or Yemen, since such travel can bring them to the attention of the authorities before they can conduct attacks, and AQAP views attacking in the West as “striking at the heart of the unbelievers.”



To further promote this concept, each edition of Inspire magazine has a section called “Open Source Jihad,” which is intended to equip aspiring jihadist attackers with the tools they need to conduct attacks without traveling to jihadist training camps. The Open Source Jihad sections in past editions have contained articles such as the pictorial guide with instructions titled “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” that appeared in the first edition.

In this latest edition of Inspire there are at least three places where AQAP encourages jihadists to conduct “lone wolf” attacks rather than coordinate with others due to the security risks inherent in such collaboration (several jihadist plots have been thwarted when would-be attackers have approached government informants looking for assistance). In recent years there have been a number of lone wolf attacks inside the United States, such as the June 2009 shooting at an armed forces recruiting center in Little Rock, Ark.; the November 2009 Fort Hood shooting; and the failed bombing attack in New York’s Times Square in May 2010. Of course, the lone wolf phenomena is not just confined to the United States, as evidenced by such incidents as the March 2 shooting attack against U.S. military personnel in Frankfurt, Germany.

In the past, STRATFOR has examined the challenges that lone wolf assailants and small, insulated cells — what we call grassroots jihadists — present to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. We have also discussed the fact that, in many cases, grassroots defenders such as local police officers can be a more effective defense against grassroots attackers than centralized federal agencies.

But local federal agents and local police officers are not the only grassroots defenders who can be effective in detecting lone wolves and small cells before they are able to launch an attack. Many of the steps required to conduct a terrorist attack are undertaken in a manner that makes the actions visible to any outside observer. It is at these junctures in the terrorist attack cycle that people practicing good situational awareness can detect these attack steps — not only to avoid the danger themselves, but also to alert the authorities to the suspicious activity.

Detecting grassroots operatives can be difficult, but it is possible if observers focus not only on the “who” aspect of a terrorist attack but also the “how” — that is, those activities that indicate an attack is in the works. In the past we’ve talked in some detail about detecting preoperational surveillance as part of this focus on the “how.” Now, we would like to focus on detecting another element of the “how” of terrorism and discuss the ways one can detect signs of improvised-explosives preparation — in other words, how to tell if your neighbor is a bombmaker.


IEDs and Explosive Mixtures
In the 11th edition of “Sada al-Malahim,” AQAP’s Arabic-language online jihadist magazine, Nasir al-Wahayshi noted that jihadists “don’t need to conduct a big effort or spend a lot of money to manufacture 10 grams of explosive material” and that they should not “waste a long time finding the materials, because you can find all these in your mother’s kitchen, or readily at hand or in any city you are in.” Al-Wahayshi is right. It truly is not difficult for a knowledgeable individual to construct improvised explosives from a wide range of household chemicals like peroxide and acetone or chlorine and brake fluid.

It is important to recognize that when we say an explosive mixture or an explosive device is “improvised,” the improvised nature of that mixture or device does not automatically mean that the end product is going to be ineffective or amateurish. Like an improvised John Coltrane saxophone solo, some improvised explosive devices can be highly crafted and very deadly works of art. Now, that said, even proficient bombmakers are going to conduct certain activities that will allow their intent to be discerned by an outside observer — and amateurish bombmakers are even easier to spot if one knows what to look for.

In an effort to make bombmaking activity clandestine, explosive mixtures and device components are often manufactured in rented houses, apartments or hotel rooms. We have seen this behavior in past cases, like the December 1999 incident in which the “Millennium Bomber” Ahmed Ressam and an accomplice set up a crude bombmaking factory in a hotel room in Vancouver, British Colombia. More recently, Najibullah Zazi, who was arrested in September 2009, was charged with attempting to manufacture the improvised explosive mixture tri-acetone tri-peroxide (TATP) in a Denver hotel room. In September 2010, a suspected lone wolf assailant in Copenhagen accidentally detonated an explosive device he was constructing in a hotel. Danish authorities believe the device was intended for an attack on the Jyllands-Posten newspaper, which was targeted because of its involvement in publishing the controversial cartoons featuring the Prophet Mohammed.

Similar to clandestine methamphetamine labs (which are also frequently set up in rental properties or hotel rooms), makeshift bombmaking operations frequently utilize volatile substances that are used in everyday life. Chemicals such as acetone, a common nail polish remover, and peroxide, commonly used in bleaching hair, can be found in most grocery, beauty, drug and convenience stores. Fertilizers, the main component of the bombs used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center attack, can be found in large volumes on farms or in farm supply stores in rural communities.

However, the quantities of these chemicals required to manufacture explosives is far in excess of that required to remove nail polish or bleach hair. Because of this, hotel staff, landlords and neighbors can fairly easily notice signs that someone in their midst is operating a makeshift bombmaking laboratory. They should be suspicious, for example, if a new tenant moves several bags of fertilizer into an apartment in the middle of a city, or if a person brings in gallons of acetone, peroxide or sulfuric or nitric acid. Furthermore, in addition to chemicals, bombmakers also utilize laboratory implements such as beakers, scales, protective gloves and masks — things not normally found in a hotel room or residence.

Additionally, although electronic devices such as cellphones or wristwatches may not seem unusual in the context of a hotel room or apartment, signs that such devices have been disassembled or modified should raise a red flag, as these devices are commonly used as initiators for improvised explosive devices. There are also certain items that are less commonly used in household applications but that are frequently used in bombmaking, things like nitric or sulfuric acid, metal powders such as aluminum, magnesium and ferric oxide, and large quantities of sodium carbonate — commonly purchased in 25-pound bags. Large containers of methyl alcohol, used to stabilize nitroglycerine, is another item that is unusual in a residential or hotel setting and that is a likely signal that a bombmaker is present.

Fumes from the chemical reactions are another telltale sign of bombmaking activity. Depending on the size of the batch being concocted, the noxious fumes from an improvised explosive mixture can bleach walls and curtains and, as was the case for the July 2005 London attackers, even the bombmakers’ hair. The fumes can even waft outside of the lab and be detected by neighbors in the vicinity. Spatter from the mixing of ingredients like nitric acid leaves distinctive marks, which are another way for hotel staff or landlords to recognize that something is amiss. Additionally, rented properties used for such activity rarely look as if they are lived in. They frequently lack furniture and have makeshift window coverings instead of drapes. Properties where bomb laboratories are found also usually have no mail delivery, sit for long periods without being occupied and are occupied by people who come and go erratically at odd hours and are often seen carrying strange things such as containers of chemicals.

The perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing manufactured the components for the truck bomb used in that attack in a rented apartment in Jersey City, N.J. The process of cooking the nitroglycerine used in the booster charges and the urea nitrate used in the main explosive charge created such strong chemical fumes that some of the paint on the walls was changed from white to blue and metal doorknobs and hinges inside of the apartment were visibly corroded. The bombmakers also flushed some of the excess chemicals down the toilet, spilling some of them on the bathroom floor and leaving acidic burn marks. The conspirators also spilled chemicals on the floor in other places, on the walls of the apartment, on their clothing and on other items, leaving plenty of trace evidence for investigators to find after the attack.

Given the caustic nature of the ingredients used to make homemade explosive mixtures — chemicals that can burn floors and corrode metal — and the very touchy chemical reactions required to make things like nitroglycerin and TATP, making homemade explosives can be one of the most dangerous aspects of planning an attack. Indeed, Hamas militants refer to TATP as “the Mother of Satan” because of its volatility and propensity to either severely burn or kill bombmakers if they lose control of the chemical reaction required to manufacture it.

In January 1995, an apartment in Manila, Philippines, caught fire when the bombmaker in the 1993 World Trade Center attack, Abdel Basit (aka Ramzi Yousef), lost control of the reaction in a batch of TATP he was brewing for his planned attack against a number of U.S. airliners flying over the Pacific Ocean — an operation he had nicknamed Bojinka. Because of the fire, authorities were able to arrest two of Basit’s co-conspirators and unravel Bojinka and several other attack plots against targets like Pope John Paul II and U.S. President Bill Clinton. Basit himself fled to Pakistan, where he was apprehended a short time later. This case serves to highlight the dangers presented by these labs to people in the vicinity — especially in a hotel or apartment building.

Another form of behavior that provides an opportunity to spot a bombmaker is testing. A professional bombmaker will try out his improvised mixtures and components, like improvised blasting caps, to ensure that they are functioning properly and that the completed device will therefore be viable. Such testing will involve burning or detonating small quantities of the explosive mixture, or actually exploding the blasting cap. The testing of small components may happen in a backyard, but the testing of larger quantities will often be done at a more remote place. Therefore, any signs of explosions in remote places like parks and national forests should be immediately reported to authorities.

Obviously, not every container of nitric acid spotted or small explosion heard will be absolute confirmation of bombmaking activity, but reporting such incidents to the authorities will give them an opportunity to investigate and determine whether the incidents are indeed innocuous. In an era when the threat of attack comes from increasingly diffuse sources, a good defense requires more eyes and ears than the authorities possess. As the New York Police Department has so aptly said, if you see something, say something.

How to tell if your meighbor is a bombmaker is republished with permission of STRATFOR.